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Abstract. The essential difficulty about Computer Ethics’ (CE) philosophical status is a methodological problem:
standard ethical theories cannot easily be adapted to deal with CE-problems, which appear to strain their
conceptual resources, and CE requires a conceptual foundation as an ethical theory. Information Ethics (IE),
the philosophical foundational counterpart of CE, can be seen as a particular case of ‘environmental’ ethics or
ethics of the infosphere. What is good for an information entity and the infosphere in general? This is the ethical
question asked by IE. The answer is provided by a minimalist theory of deserts: IE argues that there is something
more elementary and fundamental than life and pain, namely being, understood as information, and entropy, and
that any information entity is to be recognised as the centre of a minimal moral claim, which deserves recognition
and should help to regulate the implementation of any information process involving it. IE can provide a valuable
perspective from which to approach, with insight and adequate discernment, not only moral problems in CE, but
also the whole range of conceptual and moral phenomena that form the ethical discourse.
“We, who have a private life and hold it infinitely
the dearest of our possessions . . . ” Virginia Woolf,
“Montaigne”1
“And I let myself go in a dream of lands where every
force should be so regulated, every expenditure so
compensated, all exchanges so strict, that the slightest
waste would be appreciable; then I applied my dream
to life and imagined a code of ethics which should
institute the scientific and perfect utilisation of man’s
self by a controlling intelligence”2
The foundationalist problem
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importance of the very urgent issues discussed by
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1960.
Computer Ethics (henceforth CE) have not yet
succeeded in raising it to the status of a philosophically
respectable topic. If they take any notice of it, most
philosophers nowadays look down on CE as on a prac-
tical subject, a ‘professional ethics’ unworthy of their
analyses and speculations. They treat it like Carpentry
Ethics, to use a Platonic metaphor.
The inescapable interdisciplinarity of CE has
certainly done the greatest possible harm to the
prospects for recognition of its philosophical signifi-
cance. Everyone’s concern is usually nobody’s busi-
ness, and CE is at too much of a crossroads of technical
matters, moral and legal issues, social as well as polit-
ical problems and conceptual analyses to be anyone’s
own game. Philosophers’ notorious conservatism may
also have been a hindrance. After all, Aristotle, Mill
or Kant never said a word about it, and ‘professional
philosophers’ who know their syllabus do not often
hold very broad views about which new philosophical
questions may qualify as philosophers’ own special
problems. Yet these and other external factors, such
as the novelty of its questions and the conspicuously
applied nature of its answers, should not conceal the
fact that the essential difficulty about CE’s philosoph-
ical status lies elsewhere, and more internally. For it is
a methodological problem, and concerns its conceptual
foundation as an ethical theory.
CE shares with other philosophical disciplines in
the analytic tradition three important but rather too
general features:
1. it is logically argumentative, with a bias for analo-
gical reasoning
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2. it is empirically grounded, with a bias for
scenarios analysis, and
3. it endorses a problem solving approach.
Besides 1–3, CE also presents a more peculiar aspect,
which has so far acted as its driving force, namely:
4. it is intrinsically decision-making oriented.
These four features can be read in a roughly inverted
order of importance. Why CE shares them, and
whether it ought to, are questions sufficiently obvious
to deserve no detailed comment here. Technolo-
gical changes have outpaced ethical developments,
bringing about unanticipated problems that have
caused a “policy vacuum”3 filled by CE, which has
initially surfaced from practical concerns arising in
the information society. Rational decisions have to
be taken, technical, educational and ethical prob-
lems must be solved, legislation needs to be adopted,
and a combination of empirical evidence and logical
arguments seems to provide the most obvious and
promising means to achieve such pressing goals. A
rather more interesting point is that 1–4 constitute
the theoretical justification of CE’s present inductive
methodology, which leads us to:
5. it is based on case studies.
During the last two decades, CE has consistently
adopted a bottom-up procedure, carrying out an
extended and intensive analysis of individual cases,
amounting very often to real-world issues rather
than mental experiments. Its aim has been to reach
decisions based on principled choices and defen-
sible ethical principles and hence to provide more
generalised conclusions – in terms of conceptual eval-
uations, moral insights, normative guidelines, educa-
tional programs or legal advice – which might apply
to whole classes of comparable cases. On the grounds
of such extensive evidence and analysis, defenders of
the novelty and originality of a CE-approach to moral
issues have developed two types of argument.
They have either suggested, perhaps too gener-
ally, that 1–5 are sufficient to qualify CE as a
well-grounded philosophical discipline. Or they have
argued, more specifically and somewhat more force-
fully, that on the one hand the ICT (digital Informa-
tion and Communication Technology) revolution, its
scale and complexity, malfunctioning computers and
computer misuse have created a whole new range
of social problems (computer crime, software theft,
hacking, viruses, privacy, over-reliance on intelligent
machines, workplace stress, intellectual and social
discrimination etc.) which have given rise to a new
3 Cf. James H. Moor. What Is Computer Ethics?Meta-
philosophy, 16.4, pp. 266–275, 1985.
grey area of moral dilemmas, not all of which are just
ICT versions of old moral issues; and that, on the other
hand, the new and old ethical problems CE works on
within the context of (5) – the PAPA group,4 that is
privacy, accuracy, intellectual property and access, but
also security and reliability, being arguably some of
the best examples – have been so transformed by the
computing technology in which they are embedded
that they acquire an altered form and new meanings;
and finally that, in both cases, we are confronted by the
emergence of an innovative ethical approach, namely
CE, which is at the same time original and of an
unquestionable philosophical value.
Unfortunately, however, neither line of reasoning
carries much weight. The more general thesis just fails
to be convincing, whereas the more restricted thesis is,
more interestingly, the actual source of the foundation-
alist crisis that presently afflicts CE. I shall later defend
the view that CE does have something distinctive and
substantial to say on moral problems, and hence can
contribute a new and interesting perspective to the
ethical discourse, but at the moment we need to realise
that features 1–3 fail to make CE any different from,
let alone better than, other ethical theories already
available, most notably Consequentialism and Deonto-
logism, while we have seen that feature 4 may work
equally well against CE’s philosophical ambitions, for
it leads to the Carpentry problem. As for feature 5,
it takes only a moment of reflection to realise that,
together with 4, it is one of the factors that contri-
butes to, rather than solves, the foundational problem,
for the following reason. If new moral problems have
any theoretical value, either by themselves or because
embedded in original contexts, they usually provide
only further evidence for the discussion of well-
established ethical doctrines. Thus, CE-problems may
work as counterexamples, show the limits or stretch
the conceptual resources of already availablemacro-
ethics, that is theoretical, field-independent, applicable
ethics, but can never give rise to a substantially new
ethical perspective, unless they are the source of some
very radical reinterpretation. ICT, by transforming in
a profound way the context in which some old ethical
issues arise, not only adds interesting new dimensions
to old problems, but may lead us to rethink, methodo-
logically, the very grounds on which our ethical posi-
tions are based. Missing the latter perspective, even
people who support the importance of the work done
4 R. Mason. Four Ethical Issues of the Information Age.MIS
Quarterly10.1, pp. 5–12, 1986. In this provocative essay Mason
discusses dilemmas thought to be unique to ICT and identifies
at least four main ethical issues for ICT professionals: privacy,
accuracy, ownership, and access to information, summarised
by the acronym PAPA. The essay has been influential in the
subsequent literature.
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in CE are led to adopt a dismissive attitude towards its
philosophical significance, and argue that there is no
special category of computer ethics, but just ordinary
ethical situations in which computers and digital tech-
nology are involved, and therefore that CE is at most
a microethics, that is a practical, field-dependent,
applied and professional ethics.5 Interest in CE is
then more justified than interest in Carpentry Ethics
only because, in the information society, computers
rather than timber permeate and influence almost every
aspect of our lives, so we need a conceptual interface
to apply ethical theories to new scenarios. If there were
only a limited number of machines, kept under very
tight control, there would be neither CE nor any need
for it.
Behind CE’s foundationalist problem there lies
a lack of a strong ethical programme. Although
everyone seems to agree that CE deals with innova-
tive ethical issues arising in ICT contexts within 5,
instead of reflecting on their roots and investigating, as
thoroughly as possible, what new theoretical insights
they could offer, we are urged by features 3 and 4 to
rush on, and look immediately for feasible solutions
and implementable decisions. The result is inevitably
disappointing: 3 and 4 load 5 with an unduly action-
oriented meaning (see below) and CE-problems are
taken to entail the fact that CE is primarily, when not
exclusively, concerned with the moral value of human
actions. Understood as a mere decision-making and
action-oriented theory, CE appears only as a prac-
tical subject, which can hardly add anything to already
well-developed ethical theories.
This is the present state in which CE finds itself.
Moral problems in CE, with their theoretical implica-
tions, are invariably approached against the back-
ground of a Deontologist, Contractualist or, more
often, Consequentialist position. Predictably, CE itself
is either disregarded, as a mere practical field of no
philosophical interest, or colonised as a special domain
of the application of action-oriented (see below) ethics
5 For an influential defence of this view see for example
Deborah D. Johnson in herComputer Ethics, 2nd ed. (Upper
Saddle River N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1994). Johnson shows some
sympathy for a moderately Kantian perspective, but does not
take an explicit position. The main thesis is that ethical issues
surrounding computers are not wholly new, and that it is not
necessary to create a new ethical theory or system to deal with
them. They have some unique features, but we can rely on
our traditional moral principles and theories. A radical posi-
tion is taken by Duncan Langford inPractical Computer Ethics
(London: McGraw-Hill, 1995), who disregards a philosophical
approach to CE as dispensable: “[. . . ] thisbook is not a work of
theoretical analysis and discussion. Practical Computer Ethics
is not for academic philosophers” (from the very first paragraph
of the Introduction).
in search of intellectual adventures.6 Conceptually,
it is a most unsatisfactory situation, for two related
clusters of reasons.
Macroethics and computer ethics
On the more negative side, the nature of CE-
problems seems to strain the conceptual resources
of action-oriented theories more seriously than
is usually suspected. When consistently applied,
both Consequentialism, Contractualism and Deonto-
logism show themselves unable to accommodate
CE-problems easily, and in the end may well be inad-
equate. Two possible forms of distortion, sometimes
caused by the application of inappropriate action-
oriented analyses, are the projection of human agency,
intelligence, freedom and intentionality (desires, fears,
expectations, hopes etc.) onto the computational
system, and the tendency to delegate to the computa-
tional system as an increasingly authoritative interme-
diary agent (it is not unusual to hear people dismiss
an error as only the fault of a computer). In both
cases, we witness the erosion of the agent’s sense of
moral responsibility for his or her actions. Without
an ‘object-oriented’ approach (see below), computer
ethics may end up anthropomorphizing computational
systems.
That such limits have not yet been fully and
explicitly investigated in CE literature, despite
their decisive importance, is a clear mark of the
extraordinary sense of inferiority shown by CE
towards philosophically better-established theories.
Here, I can only alert the reader to the problem by
sketching a few points.
To begin with, we might expect that the empir-
ical, decision-making orientation of CE-problems
would tend to make Deontologism, with its inflex-
ible universal maxims and duty-based ethics, a much
less likely candidate than either Contractualism or
Consequentialism; while the strength of the conflicting
interactions between different rights, duties and moral
values, emerging from the case-studies carried on so
far – think, for example, of society’s right to security
vs. cryptography, of privacy vs. public control of
information, of freedom of expression vs. offensive
information – further undermines the viability of a
purely Deontological approach to CE. Even more
specifically, Kant’s moral imperatives appear to be
6 See for example D. M. Ermann, M. B. Williams and
M. S. Shauf, editors,Computers, Ethics and Society, 2nd
ed. New York: Oxford U.P., 1997. Especially the first part,
entitled Computers in an Ethical Framework for a philosophical
perspective.
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challenged by two problems. Neither the law of impar-
tiality (the Golden rule) nor the law of universality
(behave as a universal legislator) are sufficient to
approach the following two types of problems:
1. CE-problems not involving human beings.
Common sense rejects the idea that there might be
victimless crimes, e.g. computer crimes against banks,
or that vandalism may not be morally blameworthy (I
shall come back to this problem later), yet it is unclear
how a Deontological approach can cope with this kind
of problem, since both Kantian imperatives apply only
to anthropocentric contexts.
2. CE-problems with a ludic nature.
The agent often perceives computer crimes as games or
intellectual challenges and his actions as role playing.
Because of the remoteness of the process, the imma-
terial nature of information and the virtual interaction
with faceless individuals, the information environment
(the infosphere) is easily conceived of as a magical,
political, social, financial dream-like environment, and
anything but a real world, so a person may wrongly
infer that her actions are as unreal and insignificant
as the killing of enemies in a virtual game. The
consequence is that not only does the person not feel
responsible for her actions (no one has ever been
charged with murder for having killed some monsters
in a video game), but she may be perfectly willing
to accept the universal maxim, and to extend the
rules of the game to all agents. The hacker can be
a perfect Kantian because universality without any
concern for the actual consequences of an action is
ethically powerless in a moral game.
The previous problems may help to explain why, in
practice, most of the theoretical literature on CE tends
to adopt some pragmatic version of the MINMAX and
Golden rules (minimise harms, maximise benefits and
“do unto others as you would have them do unto you”)
and is often more or less knowingly Consequentialist
and sometimes Contractualist in orientation. Things,
however, are no more promising if we look at these two
approaches, for they too end up strained by the nature
of the problems in question. A few essential issues may
be sufficient to illustrate the point:
1. the virtual nature of the actions in question often
makes it possible for them to remain completely
undetected and to leave no really perceptible
effects behind;
2. even when 1 does not apply, ICT distances
the agent from, and hence diminishes his
sense of direct responsibility for his computer-
mediated, computer-controlled and computer-
generated actions. Besides, the increasing separa-
tion of actions and their effects, both in terms of
the anonymity of the agent and in terms of concep-
tual distance, makes ‘moral sanctions’ (in Mill’s
sense) ever less perceptible by the agent the more
indirect, distant and obscure the consequences of
his actions are;
3. in connection with 1–2, there is a corresponding
de-personalisation and an increasing sense of the
practical anonymity of actions/effects, in a context
where an individual agent’s behaviour is often
rightly perceived as only a marginal and micro-
scopic component of wider and more complex
courses of action. The diffusion of responsi-
bility brings with it a diminished ethical sense in
the agent and a corresponding lack of perceived
accountability;
4. in connection with 1–3, the high level of control
and compartmentalisation of actions tends to
restrict them and their evaluation to specific areas
of potential misbehaviour;
5. in connection with 1–4, the ostensibly negative
anthropology resulting from CE case-studies
shows that human nature, when left to itself,
is much more Hobbesian and Darwinian than
Consequentialism may be ready to admit and
hence able to cope with. The increasing number
and variety of computer crimes committed by
perfectly respectable and honest people shows
the full limits of an action-oriented approach to
CE: computer criminals often do not perceive,
or perceive in a distorted way, the nature of
their actions because they have been educated to
conceive as potentially immoral only human inter-
actions in real life, or actions involving physical
and tangible objects. A cursory analysis of the
justifications that hackers usually offer for their
actions, for example, is sufficient to clarify imme-
diately that they often do not understand the real
implications of their behaviour, independently of
their technical competence. We have already seen
that this problem affects a Deontological approach
as well (the ludic problem);
6. even when 1–5 do not apply, the great
complexity of the constantly changing infosphere
often makes any reasonable calculation or fore-
casting of the long-term, aggregate value of the
global consequences of an individual’s actions
impossible;
7. quite apart from 1–6, the individual and his/her
rights acquires an increasing importance within
the information society, not just as an agent, but
also as a potential target of automatically tailored
actions, yet individual’s rights are something that
Consequentialism has always found difficult to
accommodate.
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With the exception of point 5 and the inclusion of the
next point
8. in connection with 1–4, the asymmetric nature of
‘virtual’ actions gives rise to a ‘state of nature’
where individuals are very far from having even
a vaguely comparable strength, either technical
or technological, and therefore the ‘strongest’
can behave perfectly rationally, ‘opt out’ of the
social contract and be successful. For example,
a very appropriate game-theoretic approach to
CE-problems would show that, since there are
never equal conditions, the ‘game’ is heavily
biased towards the hacker; suffice to mention here
that most experts agree that the vast majority
of computer crimes remain undetected, not just
unpunished;
the previous problems can be extended to Contrac-
tualism as well, if we treat it as a version of
Consequentialism based on a negative anthropology
and a conception of the nature of actions as always
rationally motivated only by self-interest (I shall very
briefly comment on a Deontological form of Contrac-
tualism later).
If Deontologism, Consequentialism and Contrac-
tualism are not ready-to-use programmes, which need
to be only slightly recompiled to become applicable
in the context of CE and deliver the expected results,
on the more positive side we may wish radically to
re-consider the action-oriented nature of CE itself.
For this, we first need to sketch a simple model of
macroethics.
A model of macroethics
Any action, whether morally loaded or not, has the
logical structure of a binary relation between an agent
and a patient. The interpretation of what can then
be inferred from the occurrence ofprima faciemoral
actions, in terms of what is the primary object of
the ethical discourse, is a matter of philosophical
controversy. Virtue Ethics, and Greek philosophy
more generally, concentrates its attention on the moral
nature and development of the individual agent who
performs the action. It can therefore be properly
described as an agent-oriented, ‘subjective’ ethics.
Since the agent is usually assumed to be a single
human being, Virtue Ethics is intrinsically anthropo-
centric and individualistic. Nothing would prevent it
from being applicable to non-individual agents, like
political parties, companies or teams, yet this is not
usually the way in which Virtue Ethics is developed,
partly because of a historical limitation, which has
Greek roots in the individualist conception of the
agent in question and the metaphysical interpretation
of his functional development, and partly because
of a contemporary empiricist bias, which consists in
an anti-realist conception of non-individual entities –
paradoxically, we live in a materialist culture based
on ICT but we do not treat data or information
as real objects – and in a pre-theoretical refusal to
conceive of moral virtues also as holistic properties of
complex systems. We shall see later that the removal of
such limitations has interesting consequences for the
foundation of CE.
Developed in a world profoundly different from
the small, non-Christian Athens, Utilitarianism, or
more generally Consequentialism, Contractualism and
Deontologism are the three most well-known theories
that concentrate on the moral nature and value of
the actions performed by the agent. They are ‘rela-
tional’ and action-oriented theories, intrinsically social
in nature. They obviously anchor the stability of the
moral value of human actions very differently – the
former two a posteriori, through the assessment of
their consequences in terms of global and personal
welfare, the latter a priori, through universal principles
and the individual’s sense of duty – but the principal
target of their analysis remains unchanged, for they
both tend to treat the relata, i.e. the individual agent
and the individual patient, as secondary in importance,
and may sometimes end up losing sight of their destiny.
From their relational perspective, what the individual
agent becomes or does in his autonomy, and quite
irrespective of external factors, as may be the case
in Virtue Ethics, now has less importance than the
more significant interactions between the agent and
the surrounding society, or even the simple possibility
of such interactions (the Kantian universal maxim).
These ethics may be based on a central concept of self-
interest (Consequentialism and Contractualism) but
heir analyses focus primarily on the nature of action
and choice, understood as the function from human
interests to moral values, and thus shift the atten-
tion from a purely agent-oriented to a substantially
interaction-oriented approach. Thanks to this shift in
perspective, the philosophy of history, understood as
the ethical interpretation of the collection of all signi-
ficant actions liable of a moral evaluation, acquires
more relevance than pedagogy, that is the development
and evaluation of an individual’s cultivation. Having
thus made the conception of human nature more peri-
pheral to the ethical discourse than mankind’s deeds,
‘relational’ theories can finally ease and promote the
enlargement of the concept of a morally respon-
sible agent as a free and rational centre of rights
and duties, which slowly comes to include, besides
the Athenian gentleman, also women, homosexuals,
people of other cultures, minority groups and members
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of all social classes, in a word any free and rational
agent.
Since agent-oriented, intra-subjective theories and
action-oriented, infra-subjective theories are all inevit-
ably anthropocentric, we may follow common practice
and define them as ‘standard’ or ‘classic’, without
necessarily associating any positive evaluation with
either of these two adjectives. Apart from the contro-
versial case represented by a Kantian version of
Contractualism à la Rawls – which runs into other
difficulties, but must be acknowledged to stress the
crucial importance of the impartial nature of moral
concern, thanks to the hypothetical scenario in which
rational agents are asked to determine the nature of
society in a complete state of ignorance of what their
positions would be in it, thus transforming the agent
into the potential patient of the action – standard ethics
take only a relative interest in the ‘patient’, the third
element in a moral relation, which is on the receiving
end of the action and endures its effects. Ontological
power, however, brings with it new moral responsi-
bilities. We can respect only what we no longer fear,
yet knowledge is a process of increasing emancipa-
tion from reality and in a world in which mankind
can influence, control or manipulate practically every
aspect of reality, philosophical attention is finally
drawn to the importance of moral concerns that are
not immediately agent-oriented and anthropocentric.
Medical Ethics, Bioethics and Environmental Ethics
are the best known examples of this non-standard
approach. They attempt to develop a patient-oriented
ethics in which the ‘patient’ may be not only a human
being, but also any form of life. Indeed, Land Ethics
extends the concept of patient to any component of
the environment, thus coming close to the object-
oriented approach defended by Information Ethics,
as we shall see in a moment. Capturing what is a
pre-theoretical but very widespread intuition shared
by most people, they hold the broad view that any
form of life has some essential proprieties or moral
interests that deserve and demand to be respected.
They argue that the nature and well-being of the patient
of an action constitute its moral standing and that
the latter makes vital claims on the interacting agent
and ought to contribute to the guidance of his ethical
decisions and the constraint of his moral behaviour.
Compared to classic ethics, Bioethics, Medical and
Environmental Ethics thus turn out to be theories of
nature and space – their ethical analyses start from
the moral properties and values of what there is – no
longer of history and time (human actions and their
consequences). Moreover, since any action may seem
to be inexorably stained with evil, either because of
what it is not – from a consequentialist perspective,
every action is always improvable, so any action can
be only relatively good at most – or because of what
it could be – from a deontologist perspective, in itself
the same action leads either to morally deprecable or
just amoral behaviour if it does not spring from a sense
of duty and does not conform to the universal maxims
– one may say that classic ethics are philosophies of
the wrongdoer, whereas non-classic ethics are philo-
sophies of the victim. They place the ‘receiver’ of
the action at the centre of the ethical discourse, and
displace its ‘transmitter’ to its periphery. In so doing,
they help to widen further our anthropocentric view of
who may qualify as a centre of moral concern. We have
seen that any classic ethics is inevitably egocentric
and logo-centric – all theorising concerns a conscious
and self-assessing agent whose behaviour must be
supposed sufficiently free, reasonable and informed,
for an ethical evaluation to be possible on the basis of
his responsibility – whereas non-classic ethics, being
bio-centric and patient-oriented, are epistemologically
allocentric – i.e. they are centred on, and interested
in, the entity itself that receives the action, rather than
in its relation or relevance to the agent – and morally
altruistic, and can now include any form of life and
all vulnerable human beings within the ethical sphere,
not just foetuses, new-born babies and senile persons,
but above all physically or mentally ill, disabled or
disadvantaged people. This is an option that simply
lies beyond the immediate scope of any classic ethics,
from Athens to Könisberg.
From computer ethics to information ethics
The development of ethical theories just sketched
provides a useful perspective and hence a metatheo-
retical justification from which to interpret the nature
of CE more accurately. If one tries to pinpoint exactly
what common feature so many case-based studies in
CE share, it seems reasonable to conclude that this
is an overriding interest in the fate and welfare of
the action-receiver, the information. Despite its imme-
diate decision-making approach and its obvious social
concerns, CE is never primarily interested in the moral
value of the actions in question, let alone in the agents’
virtues or vices. Instead, CE develops its analyses,
and attempts to indicate the best course of action,
as a consequence of the steady and careful attention
paid to what happens to the information environment.
Right and wrong, in CE, do not just qualify actions
in themselves, they essentially refer to what is even-
tually better or worse for the infosphere. Therefore,
far from being a classic, action-oriented ethics, as it
may deceptively seem at first sight, CE is primarily
an ethics ofbeing rather thanconductor becoming,
and hence qualifies as non-standard ethics. The funda-
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mental difference, which sets it apart from all other
members of the same class of theories, is that CE
raises information as such, rather than just life in
general, to the role of the true and universal patient
of any action, thus presenting itself as an infocentric
and object-oriented, rather than just a biocentric and
patient-oriented ethics. Without information there is
no moral action, but information now moves from
being a necessary prerequisite for any morally respon-
sible action to being its primary object. The crucial
importance of this radical change in perspective cannot
be overestimated. We have seen that typical non-
standard ethics can reach their high level of univer-
salization of the ethical discourse only thanks to their
biocentric nature. However, this also means that even
Bioethics and Environmental Ethics fail to achieve a
level of complete universality and impartiality, because
they are still biased against what is inanimate, life-
less or merely possible (even Land Ethics is biased
against technology and artefacts, for example). From
their perspective, only what is alive deserves to be
considered as a proper centre of moral claims, no
matter how minimal, so a whole universe escapes their
attention. Now this is precisely the fundamental limit
overcome by CE, which further lowers the condition
that needs to be satisfied, in order to qualify as a
centre of a moral concern, to the minimal common
factor shared by any entity, namely its information
state. And since any form of being, is, in any case,
also a coherent body of information, to say that CE is
infocentric is tantamount to interpreting it, correctly,
as an ontocentric object-oriented theory.
At this point, it is worth pausing for a moment to
listen to lawyers, politicians, sociologists, engineers,
educators, computer scientists and many other profes-
sionals. For I fear they may be complaining that philo-
sophers cannot place their metaphysical copyright on
‘Computer Ethics’. CE is a lively and useful subject,
which should not be reduced to a mere academic
subject and esoteric field of conceptual speculations.
Their worries may not be completely unjustified. CE
offers an extraordinary theoretical opportunity for the
elaboration of a new ethical perspective, but what has
been said so far foreshadows an interpretation of CE
that places it at a level of abstraction too philosoph-
ical to make it of any direct utility for their immediate
needs. Yet, this is the inevitable price to be paid for any
attempt to provide CE with an autonomous conceptual
foundation. We must polarise theory and practice to
strengthen both, but to avoid at least some superficial
confusion, we may agree to use ‘Information Ethics’
(IE) to refer to the philosophical foundation of CE. IE
will not be immediately useful to solve specific CE-
problems but it will provide the grounds for the moral
principles that will then guide the problem-solving
procedures in CE. Professional codes of conduct,
rules, guidelines, advices, instructions or standards,
computer or information related legislation, are all
based on an implicit philosophical ethics. It is the latter
that we shall investigate in the following pages.
Information ethics as an object-oriented and
ontocentric theory
From an IE perspective, the ethical discourse now
comes to concern information as such, that is not just
all persons, their cultivation, well-being and social
interactions, not just animals, plants and their proper
atural life, but also anything that exists, from paint-
ings and books to stars and stones; anything that may
or will exist, like future generations; and anything that
was but is no more, like our ancestors. Unlike other
non-standard ethics, IE is more impartial and universal
– or one may say less ethically biased – because it
brings to ultimate completion the process of enlarge-
ment of the concept of what may count as a centre
of moral claims, which now includes every instance
of information, no matter whether physically imple-
mented or not. Such an all-embracing approach is
made possible by the fact that IE adopts the following
principles and concepts:
1. uniformity of becoming
All processes, operations, changes, actions and events
can be treated as information processes. Here process
is to be understood not in a procedural sense (e.g. as
part of a program that performs some task), but as
meaningstream of activity.
2. reflexivity of information processes
Any information process necessarily generates a trail
of information.
3. inevitability of information processes
The absence of an information process is also an
information process. This is an extension, to the
dynamics of information, of the general principle
underlying any static encoding of information, and
it is important in order to take into account the
action/omission ethical distinction.
4. uniformity of being
An entity is a consistent packet of information, that
is an item that contains no contradiction in itself
and can be named or denoted in an information
process. A contradiction, when directly and positively
used (i.e. not used at a metatheoretical level or just
mentioned), is an instance of total entropy of informa-
tion, i.e. a mark left where all information has been
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completely erased. Since an information process posi-
tively involving a contradiction ends up being itself
a source of contradiction, it is also a case of total
entropy, an information black hole, as it were. It
follows that there are no information processes fruit-
fully involving contradictions (obviously this is not
to say that there are no contradictory information
processes), that an information process can involve
anything which is in itself logically possible, and
that IE treats every logically possible entity as an
information entity.
5. uniformity of agency
An agent is any entity, as defined in 4, capable
of producing information phenomena that can affect
the infosphere. The minimal level of agency is the
mere presence of an implemented information entity,
in Heideggerian terms, theDasein– the therebeing-
hood – of an information entity implemented in the
infosphere. Not all information entities are agents (cf.
abstract information entities); many agents may often
fail to be in a position to affect the infosphere signifi-
cantly, beyond their mere presence (think of a grain of
sand in the desert or as the last grain flowing through
an hourglass determining the explosion of a bomb);
and not all agents are responsible agents (e.g. a river
or a dog), that is agents able to acquire knowledge-
awareness of the situation and capable of planning,
withholding and implementing their actions with some
freedom and according to their evaluations.
6. uniformity of non-being
Non-being is the absence or negation of any informa-
tion, or information entropy. In IE, information
entropy is asemantic, not a syntactic concept, and, as
the opposite of information capacity, it indicates the
decrease or decay of information leading to absence
of form, pattern, differentiation or content in the
infosphere.7
7 Broadly speaking, entropy is a quantity specifying the
amount of disorder, degradation or randomness in a system
bearing energy or information. More specifically, in thermo-
dynamics, entropy is a parameter representing the state of
randomness or disorder of a physical system at the atomic,
ionic, or molecular level: the greater the disorder, the higher
the entropy. In a closed system undergoing change, entropy
is a measure of the amount of thermal energy unavailable for
conversion into mechanical work: the greater the entropy the
smaller the quantity of energy available. Thus, a glass of water
with an ice cube in it has less entropy than the same glass of
water after the ice cube has melted. According to the second law
of thermodynamics, during any process the change in entropy of
a system and its surroundings is either zero or positive, so the
entropy of the universe as a whole inevitably tends towards a
maximum. In information theory, entropy is a measure of the
7. uniformity of environment
The infosphere is the environment constituted by the
totality of information entities – including all agents –
processes, their proprieties and mutual relations.
When the ethical discourse attempts to persuade and
motivate a person to act morally, an anthropocentric
and self-interested justification of goodness may well
be inevitable. However, when the primary aim of the
ethical analysis is to understand what is right and
wrong, irrespective of a specific agent’s behaviour,
it becomes possible to adopt a more objective view-
point. In this respect, IE holds that every entity, as an
expression of being, has a dignity, constituted by its
mode of existence and essence (the collection of all
the elementary proprieties that constitute it for what
it is), which deserve to be respected and hence place
moral claims on the interacting agent and ought to
contribute to the constraint and guidance of his ethical
decisions and behaviour. This ontological equality
principle means that any form of reality (any instance
of information), simply for the fact of being what it is,
enjoys an initial, overridable, equal right to exist and
develop in a way which is appropriate to its nature.
The conscious recognition of the ontological
equality principle presupposes,a parte ante, a disin-
terested judgement of the moral situation from an
absolute perspective, i.e. a perspective which is as
object-oriented as possible. Moral behaviour is less
likely without this epistemic virtue. At most, we can
only act to the best of our knowledge of the likely
consequences and implications of the action under-
taken, yet this is hardly sufficient to ensure that our
actions will be morally right if our knowledge is either
limited or biased towards the agent and what is best
only for him, and does not include a wider degree
of attentiveness to the patient as well. Thus, a form
of moral luck arises when an interested and subject-
noise, or random errors, occurring in the transmission of signals
or messages, whereas information is a measure of the prob-
ability of a message being selected from the set of all possible
messages. Both concepts are therefore purely syntactic: neither
information nor entropy refer to the actual meaning, content
or interpretation of the message (a string of nonsense symbols
and a meaningful sentence may be equivalent with respect to
information content), but both quantitative parameters are based
only on the presence of uninterpreted difference. The greater
the information in a message, the lower its randomness, or
noisiness, and hence the smaller its entropy. In IE, we still
treat the two concepts of information and entropy as having
the same inverted relation, but we are concerned with their
semantic value: for example, as the infosphere becomes increas-
ingly meaningful and rich in content, the amount of information
increases and entropy decreases, or as entities wear out, entropy
increases and the amount of information decreases.
INFORMATION ETHICS: ON THE PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATION OF COMPUTER ETHICS 45
oriented judgement leads to a course of action which
turns out to be respectful of the rights of the patients as
well, though only by chance.
The application of the ontological equality prin-
ciple is achieved,a parte post, whenever actions are
impartial, universal and ‘caring’. This means that IE
transforms the Golden rule, and its subsequent refine-
ments such as the Kantian moral imperative or Rawls’
choice in a state of ignorance, into the main explicit
principle of its ethical analysis, though in information
terms. We can do justice to any form of reality and deal
fairly with it only if the principles we follow and the
actions we perform
• are independent of the position we enjoy in the
moral situation, as patient or agent. We would
make the same choices and behave in the same
way even if we were at the receiving end of the
action (impartiality);
• can regulate the behaviour of any other agent
placed in any other similar moral situation.
Anyone else would make the same choices and behave
in the same way in a similar situation (universality);
• look after the welfare of both the agent and the
patient (‘care-fullness’).
Our choices and behaviour are as subject-oriented
(agents’ self-interest) as object-oriented (patient’s
sake).
Biocentric ethics ground their analyses of the moral
standing of bio-entities on the intrinsic worthiness of
life and the intrinsically negative value of suffering.
By endorsing the ontological equality principle, IE
suggests that there is something even more elementary
and fundamental than life and pain, namely being,
understood as information, and entropy. IE holds that
being/information has an intrinsic worthiness, and
substantiates this position by recognising that any
information entity has a ‘Spinozian’ right to persist in
its own status, and a ‘Constructionist’ right to flourish,
i.e. to improve and enrich its existence and essence.
We shall presently see that, as a consequence of such
‘rights’, IE evaluates the duty of any rational being in
terms of contribution to the growth of the infosphere,
and any process, action or event that negatively affects
the whole infosphere – not just an information entity
– as an increase in its level of entropy and hence an
instance of evil.
The description of the specific essence of classes
of information entities is a task to be left to a plurality
of ontologies. When the information entities in ques-
tion are human beings, for example, we refer to the
analysis of human rights. Unfortunately, this clear
limit in our knowledge is of the greatest importance,
for it reminds us that, like many other macroethics, IE
relies on the agent’s knowledge for the implementation
of the right action. As in the case of Consequen-
tialism, IE may partly rely on moral education and
the transmission of whatever humanity has been able
to understand about the nature of the world and hence
its intrinsic rights, thus adopting a rule-ethics rather
than an act-ethics approach, but it must also acknow-
ledge the fact that even a good will acts in the dark
of ignorance and that, as human beings, we shall
always lack full ethical competence. This is why our
first duty is epistemic: whenever possible, we must try
to understand before acting. This also explains why
moral education consists primarily in negative prin-
ciples and a fundamental training not to interfere with
the world, to abstain from engaging in positive actions
and tampering with nature. In most cases, we simply
do not know where aprima faciepositive interaction
with reality would lead us, or what negative outcome
even well-meant actions may have. I shall return to the
risky nature of moral actions in the following pages.
What we can attempt here is rather an analysis of the
specific elementary proprieties of the whole infosphere
that in principle ought to be respected and enhanced by
any interactive agent. This is what we are now going
to see before turning to the moral laws prescribed by
IE.
On the properties of the infosphere
According to IE, there is a cluster of features, related
to the well-being of (regions of) the infosphere not
in a contingent, external and means-end relation, but
internally and in a constitutive sense, which either
make the infosphere possible or whose increasing
fulfilment make (regions of) the infosphere flourish.
Drawing up an exhaustive list of such features lies
beyond the present scope of this paper, but we may
make sufficient suggestions to clarify the point in
question.
Although the tentative list in Table 1 is far
from being uncontroversial and could probably be
improved, what matters most is that information prop-
erties can all be organised into four classes, three
of which do not belong to the computer age at
all, but indicate the older conceptual roots of IE.
The Modal class includes values 1–3 and grants to
regions of the infosphere, e.g. a particular class of
information entities, a ‘Neo-Platonic’ right to various
degrees/types of existence. Perhaps I should alert the
non-philosopher reader that this point is highly contro-
versial: suffice it to say that the whole debate on the
ontological proof is based on an interpretation of 1–
3 and that nowadays it is usually accepted, as an
established point, that ‘existence’ cannot count as a
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Table 1. Features of the infosphere
Information properties of Comments Entropy
(regions of) the infosphere
Modal properties
1. consistency logical possibility inconsistency
2. implementability practical possibility impossibility
3. occurrence actual existence absence
Humanistic properties
4. persistency volatility, transitoriness, ephemerality
5. stability instability
6. safety loss or destruction
7. security misuse, unauthorised use or modification
8. confidentiality trust disclosure
9. currency This is about updating as much as about
deleting (hence forgetting): e.g. the U.S.
federal statute Fair Credit Reporting Act states
that arrest information or criminal records
cannot be maintained more than 7 years after
the disposition, release or parole of the indi-
vidual. Many other adverse data cannot be





13. authenticity sincerity, honesty inauthenticity
14. reliability based on 1–10 unreliability
15. richness poverty






21. sharability repeatedly usable, multi-usable
22. order disorder






27. normativity elimination of useless redundancy, reduction of
waste, sustainable development
redundancy
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predicate and the Gassendi-Kant line of reasoning is
considered to be more convincing than the Plotinus-
Anselm-Descartes-Hegel line. The Humanistic class
includes values 4–16 and grants to the infosphere a
‘Spinozian’ right to various forms of preservation and
wholeness. The Illuministic class includes values 17–
23 and grants to the infosphere a Libertarian right
to various forms of openness and freedom. Only the
fourth class, including values 24–27, has no actual
precedent in the history of culture. We may call it the
Constructionist class, for it grants to the infosphere a
right to various forms of growth and enhancement. It is
one of the new aspects brought about by contemporary
ICT.
The time has now come to turn to the prescriptive
and normative principles that, according to IE, should
guide, modify and constrain information processes,
and hence also contribute to the foundation of the
moral codes by which people live.
The normative aspect of information ethics: Four
moral laws
What is good for an information entity and the
infosphere in general? This is the moral question asked
by IE. We have seen that the answer is provided
by a minimalist theory of deserts: any informa-
tion entity is recognised to be the centre of some
basic ethical claims, which deserve recognition and
should help to regulate the implementation of any
information process involving it. Approval or disap-
proval of any information process is then based on
how the latter affects the essence of the information
entities it involves and, more generally, the whole
infosphere, i.e. on how successful or unsuccessful it
is in respecting the ethical claims attributable to the
information entities involved, and hence in improving
or impoverishing the infosphere. More analytically, we
shall say that IE determines what is morally right or
wrong, what ought to be done, what the duties, the
‘oughts’ and the ‘ought nots’ of a moral agent are,
by means of four basic moral laws. I shall formulate
them here in an object-oriented version, but a subject-
oriented one is easily achievable in terms of ‘dos’ and
‘don’ts’:
0. entropy ought not to be caused in the infosphere
(null law)
1. entropy ought to be prevented in the infosphere
2. entropy ought to be removed from the infosphere
3. information welfare ought to be promoted
by extending (information quantity), improving
(information quality) and enriching (information
variety) the infosphere.
Laws are listed in order of increasing moral value.
They clarify, in very broad terms, what it means to live
as a responsible and caring agent in the infosphere. On
the one hand, a process is increasingly deprecable, and
its agent-source is increasingly blameworthy, the lower
is the number-index of the specific law that it fails to
satisfy. Let us agree to define any morally information
process in the sense just specified as a case of ‘disin-
formation’; this technical expression will turn out to
be useful in a moment. Moral mistakes may occur
and entropy may increase because of a wrong evalu-
ation of the impact of one’s actions – especially when
‘local goodness’ i.e. the improvement of a region of
the infosphere, is favoured to the overall disadvantage
of the whole environment – because of conflicting or
competing projects, even when the latter are aiming
at the satisfaction of IE moral laws, or more simply
because of the wicked nature of the agent (this possi-
bility is granted by IE’s negative anthropology). On
the other hand, a process is already commendable,
and its agent-source praiseworthy, if it satisfies the
conjunctionof the null law with at least one other
law, not thesumof the resulting effects. Note that,
according to this definition, an action is uncondi-
tionally commendable only if it never generates any
entropy in the course of its implementation, that no
positive law has a morally higher status (0∧ 1 = 0
∧ 2 = 0 ∧ 3) and that the best moral action is the
action that succeeds in satisfying all four laws at the
same time. Most of the actions that we judge morally
good do not satisfy such a strict criterion, for they
achieve only a balanced positive moral value, that is,
although their performance causes a certain quantity
of entropy, we acknowledge that the infosphere is in a
better state after their occurrence (action information
– action entropy> 0). Finally, a process that satis-
fies only the null law – the level of entropy in the
infosphere remains unchanged after its occurrence –
either has no moral value, that is, it is morally irrele-
vant or insignificant, or it is equally deprecable and
commendable, though in different respects. This last
point requires some clarification.
Although it is logically conceivable, it seems that,
strictly speaking, there can be no actual information
process that is deprecable and commendable in exactly
the same measure, that is such that its output leaves the
infosphere in exactly the same entropic state in which
it was before. Consequentialist analyses, for example,
do not really take into account the possibility that an
agent may escape any moral evaluation by perfectly
balancing the amount of happiness and unhappiness
generated by his actions. However, it is also the case
that, strictly speaking, there can be very few, if any,
information processes that are morally insignificant.
More likely, any process will always make a differ-
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ence, either positive or negative, and therefore will
always be subject to moral appraisal. This, however,
would not only be counterintuitive, but it is not even
the view defended by IE. We ordinarily treat most of
the processes/actions that take place in life as amoral,
i.e. lying beyond the scope of the ethical discourse,
for good reasons. Firstly, because we usually adopt
a less strict criterion, and accept some latitude in the
levels of entropy before and after the occurrence of
the process. Secondly, because we are acquainted with
such great forms of disinformation (killing, stealing,
lying, torturing, betraying, causing injustice, discrim-
inating, etc.), that a lot of minor fluctuations in the
level of global entropy become irrelevant. Finally
and more importantly, because many processes do
not easily modify the global level of entropy even
when they are positively immoral. People who argue
for the ‘fragility of goodness’ sometimes do so on
the mistaken basis represented by the non-monotonic
nature of goodness. Suppose a process – e.g. torturing
an innocent child – is utterly morally wrong. This
means that it generates a neat increase in the level of
entropy in the infosphere and for IE, as well as for
our pre-theoretical intuitions, this fact is irrevocable
in itself and unredeemable by later events: there is
no way of re-engineering the process so that it looses
its negative moral value. Drawing on the conceptual
vocabulary of mathematical logic, this ‘stability’ can
be defined as the monotonicity of evil. The difficulty
encountered by any pure form of Consequentialism is
that, since human rights and values (such as integ-
rity) are, in principle, always overridable depending
on the overall happiness generated a posteriori by an
action’s consequences, Consequentialism must treat
evil as non-monotonic: in theory, it is always possible
to collect and trace a sufficient amount of happiness
back to an utterly wicked action and thus force a modi-
fication in the latter’s evaluation. Now the advantage of
IE is that, like our moral intuition, it attributes a non-
monotonic nature only to goodness: unlike evil, good-
ness can, in principle, turn out to be less morally good
and sometimes even morally wrong unintentionally,
depending on how things develop, that is what new
state the infosphere enters into, as a consequence of
the process in question. This seems at least to be what
people have in mind when talking about the ‘fragility
of goodness’: perhaps there is no action that could
count as absolutely good at all times and in all places,
so do what you wish and evil will remain evil, but
make a mistake and what was initially morally good
may be corrupted or turned into evil. As I premised,
though, to describe goodness as ‘fragile’ owing to its
non-monotonicity would be a mistake because non-
monotonicity is only one of the relevant features to be
taken into account. If utter evil is monotonic,prima
facie goodness, such as disinterested love or friend-
ship, has the property of beingresilient, both in the
sense ofault-tolerance:
• to some degree, goodness has the ability to
keep the level of information welfare within the
infosphere steady, despite the occurrence of a
number of negative processes affecting it;
and in the sense oferror-recovery:
• to some extent, goodness has the ability to
resume or restore the previous positive state of
information welfare, erasing or compensating
any new entropy that may have been generated
by processes affecting it.
Resilience – what we often find described by terms
such as tolerance, forbearance, forgiveness, recon-
ciliation or simply other people’s positive behaviour
– makes goodness much more robust than its non-
monotonic nature may lead one to conclude at first
sight, and explains the presence of the entropy
balance that we experience in the infosphere, which
in turn clarifies why so many actions often lie beyond
our ethical concern: they simply fail to modify the
information/entropy balance of the infosphere signifi-
cantly.
Consider the following example. Moral actions are
risky because only a fraction of their value can depend
on our good will. We recognise this when we acknow-
ledge that a bad action is forgivable but not excusable,
while only a failed good action is excusable, and there-
fore that it is moral to do x only when x would be
prima faciea good action, but immoral to do x when
x is prima faciea bad action. Evil is monotonic, so
one should not intentionally bet on one’s own good
luck. This holds true even when some morally-risky
actions (processes, behaviours) – such as driving too
fast in a city centre – come close to the threshold
between what is morally insignificant and what is
morally wrong (e.g. a person may be injured because
of such dangerous driving, thus making speeding a
morally wrong action). According to our analysis,
these morally-risky actions can usually keep on the
amoral side thanks to their (more or less lucky) reli-
ance on the fault tolerance and error-recovering prop-
erties of the region of the infosphere they involve
(in our example, this would include, among other
factors, other drivers’ and pedestrians’ careful atti-
tude). Although it would not be morally right to rely on
it, the strength of goodness should not be undervalued:
it takes a fatal process to generate some permanent
entropy.
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Information ethics as a macroethics
The reader will recall that our investigation into the
nature of IE has been prompted by the question
whether CE can fruitfully dialogue with other macro-
ethical positions at the same conceptual level, having
something important to contribute that may perhaps
escape their conceptual frameworks. In search of an
answer, we have first freed CE from its conceptual
dependence on other macroethics and then disposed of
the mistaken interpretation of CE as a standard, action-
oriented theory. IE, the philosophical foundational
counterpart of CE, has emerged as a non-standard,
object-oriented, ontocentric theory. Our next task is
to evaluate whether this is sufficient to vindicate the
initial claim that the philosophical foundation of CE
qualifies as a macroethics. Has IE anything to teach the
other standard and non-standard macroethics? What
kind of new contribution may IE make to our better
understanding of what is morally right and wrong? We
can articulate the defence of the macroethic value of
IE in three stages, the last of which will require a new
section on its own.
IE is a complete macrotheory
This has been already argued, but it may be worth
including one more comment here. From a metaethical
view, IE is a ‘naturalist’ and ‘realist’ macroethics: the
ontological features and well-being of the infosphere
provide an ‘objective’ (i.e. object-oriented) basis
for judgements of right and wrong and generate
‘objective’ reasons for action (they are action-pulling),
while the moral system, based on the nature and
enhancement of information and the corresponding
moral claims, is universally binding, i.e. binding on
all agents in all places at all times. Although this does
not mean that IE reaches full objectivity, it does show
that IE endeavours to be as non-subjective and object-
oriented as possible. IE is not an ethics of virtue,
happiness or duty, but of respect and care (the respect
for the patient and the agent’s care). According to
IE, sometimes the right question to be asked is not
‘what oughtI to be?’ nor ‘what oughtI to do?’, but
‘whatought to be respected or improved?’, for it is the
‘what’s’ welfare that may matter most. The agent is
invited to displace himself, to concentrate his atten-
tion on the nature and future of the action-receiver,
rather than on its relation or relevance to himself, and
hence to develop an allocentric attitude, i.e. a profound
interest in, and respect for, the infosphere and its
values for their own sake, together with a complete
openness and receptivity toward it. The concept of
care, as employed by IE, is the secular equivalent
of the Pauline concept ofα’γ άπη (‘loving treatment
with affectionate regard’) orcaritas (‘dearness, love
founded on esteem’). Being has lost a religious value
and does not impose itself to the attention of the agent
anymore, so it is the agent who needs to be sensitised.
An agent cares for the patient of his actions when his
behaviour enhances the possibilities that the patient
may come to achieve whatever is good for it. While an
action which is universal and impartial may be morally
appropriate, it becomes morally good only when it is
driven by care for the patient’s sake. This is moral
altruism for IE.
IE is certainly a controversial theory
IE is certainly a controversial theory, but it is contro-
versial as a macroethics, for most of the problems
that may afflict it are problems concerning the whole
class of macrotheories. In short, whatever substantial
problems IE encounters are unlikely to be just IE’s
problems, whereas whatever solutions and insights
IE provides are its own original contributions. For
example, IE takes as its fundamental value informa-
tion, and describes entropy as evil, so that moral
prescriptivity becomes (at least also) an intrinsic prop-
erty of information: some features of the infosphere are
descriptive and action-guiding and generate reasons
for action independently of any motives or desires that
agents may actually have. Of course, this is a rather
controversial position. However, other theories are also
based on first principles, such asευ’δαιµoνία, happi-
ness, duty or life, which are equally open to discussion
(what is morally good in itself? why is x rather than y
to be considered morally good in itself?). Two of the
arguments offered by IE are its explanatory power and
degree of universality (see next paragraph). That IE’s
position may still be subject to criticism at this level
only proves that IE does represent a new perspective,
which involves the whole ethical discourse, and this is
all that matters in this context.
IE provides a valuable perspective for its own special
field but also beyond
IE provides a valuable perspective from which to
approach, with insight and adequate discernment, not
only moral problems in its own special field, but also
the whole range of conceptual and moral phenomena
that form the ethical discourse. Contrary to other
macroethics, IE has its own domain of special applica-
tion but what was a weakness now becomes a strength:
action-oriented and anthropocentric or patient-oriented
and biocentric theories seem to be inadequate to tackle
CE-problems because of the latter’s peculiarly onto-
centric and object-oriented nature. On the other hand,
hough I remarked before that non-standard ethics
move the ethical focus from history and time to nature
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and physical space, it would be a mistake to think that,
similarly, IE manages only to shift our focus a step
further. On the contrary, by enlarging the perspective
of the ethical discourse to information and its logical
space, IE clearly comes to include both history and
nature, both time and physical space within the scope
of its analysis. This has a remarkable consequence in
terms of the kind of relation that occurs between IE
and other macroethics, for IE may rightly claim the
whole domain of ethics as its area of interest. To see
that this is the case, let us briefly compare IE with the
other macroethics. We shall then analyse a few moral
cases in the following section.
IE and other non-standard ethics
The general advantage of IE over other non-standard
ethics is obvious: IE provides a more comprehensive
philosophy of nature and history, and hence can absorb
all their positive contributions without sharing the
same limits. As for any more specific comparison,
three points may be explicitly mentioned here. First,
IE does not attribute to information the same absolute
value that bio-centric theories attribute to life, and this
allows a more intuitive organisation of the environ-
ment into a scale of classes of information entities,
according to their potential capacities to implement
processes that may improve regions of influence in the
infosphere. All entities have a moral value, but they do
not share the same degree of dignity. Intuitively, from
the point of view of the infosphere and its potential
improvement, responsible agents (human beings, full-
AI robots, angels, gods, God) have greater dignity and
are the most valuable information entities deserving
the highest degree of respect because they are the only
ones capable both of knowing the infosphere and of
improving it according to the conscious implementa-
tion of their self-determined projects, by increasing
or decreasing the level of informativeness of their
actions (as the Old Testament seems to show, the
‘godness’ of God consists primarily in his omnipo-
tence). Secondly, since IE does not limit its own
area of interest to the biophysical environment, for
the infosphere includes also any other environment,
the applicability of its ethical laws is in fact field-
independent and universal. Finally and most impor-
tantly, IE does not tend to be purely conservative like
other ‘green ethics’. On the contrary, it is a ‘blue
ethics’ like Virtue Ethics (the expression comes from
‘blue-print’), that is an ethics of projects and mean-
ingful construction in a very strong sense. For IE
prizes a constructionist approach more highly than any
other attitude in life, as the right basis on which to
think, remodel and constructively improve the world
and the infosphere in general, and implement new
realities. According to its semi-teleological approach
(information processes are goal-driven, but their goals
are internal goals of a reflective self-development of
the infosphere, they are not heteronomous), the best
thing that can happen to the infosphere is to be subject
to a process of enrichment, extension and improve-
ment without any loss of information, so the most
commendable courses of action always have a caring
and constructionist nature. The moral agent is an agent
that looks after the information environment and is
able to bring about positive improvements in it, so as
to leave the infosphere in a better state than it was
in before the agent’s intervention. It is easy to see
that, given its constructionist nature, IE may approach
questions concerning e.g. abortion, eugenics, human
cloning or bioengineering very differently from other
bio-centric ethics.
IE and virtue ethics
If we now compare IE and Virtue Ethics, there is
a clear sense in which the properties listed in the
previous table can be treated as virtues, if seen from
the patient’s perspective, or values, if seen from the
agent’s perspective. The well-being of an entity as
well as of the whole infosphere consists in the preser-
vation and cultivation of its properties, so IE can
dialogue with Virtue Ethics on the basis of its object-
oriented and non-functionalist standpoint: the welfare
and flourishing of an information entity – what an
information entity should be and become – can be
objectively determined by the good qualities in, or that
may pertain to, that information entity as a specific
kind of information. The similarity between Virtue
Ethics and IE is that both treat the human being as an
entity under construction. The difference between the
two approaches lies in their ontologies and in the much
broader conception of what may count as a ‘virtuous
entity’ endorsed by IE. If anything, this seems to be a
feature that works in favour of an IE approach.
IE and deontologism
It would be possible to develop a deontological version
of IE. An IE moral imperative could be, for example:
‘act so that you never treat information, whether in
your own being or in that of another entity, only as
a means but always as an end at the same time’. Even
this modified maxim, however, already shows that IE’s
advantage over Deontologism is, again, its much wider
concept of what qualifies as a centre of ethical claims.
We have already seen that this was one of the reasons
why ethical theories have enlarged their perspective
beyond the Kantian approach. Like Deontologism, IE
treats evil as monotonic: nothing justifies the infringe-
ment of the first moral law (an increase in entropy may
often be inevitable, but is never morally justified, let
alone approved). In this sense, IE counts as what Max
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Weber called an ethics of conviction. However, unlike
Deontologism, IE does not adopt a subject-oriented
perspective (the agent’s reliance on his sense of duty)
for determining whether an action deserves to qualify
as moral. For IE, an action qualifies as moral only from
the patient’s perspective – it is only the ontology of
the victim that can really define an action as ‘right’,
not the wrongdoer or the impartial judge – so a natural
tendency to care for the welfare of the infosphere and
a spontaneous desire to make it progress can be highly
commendable virtues.
IE and consequentialism
What has been said about Deontologism holds true
for a Consequentialist version of IE as well. Broadly
speaking, both macroethics share the view that a
morally good action is an action that improves the
environment in which it takes place. Hence, as far
as its pro-information laws are concerned, IE quali-
fies, like Consequentialism, as what Max Weber calls
an ethics of responsibility. Adopting the vocabulary
of Consequentialism, we may say that the restraint
of information entropy and the active protection and
enhancement of information values are conducive to
maximal utility. We can even rephrase the Utilitarian
principle and say that: ‘Actions are right in proportion
that they tend to increase information and decrease
entropy’. However, the difference between IE and
Consequentialism remains significant, for at least the
following reasons:
1. the monotonic problem
This has been already discussed above. We have just
seen that, as far as rights and moral evil is concerned,
IE adopts a position closer to Deontologism.
2. the mathematical problem
If any quantification and calculation is possible at
all in the determination of a moral life, then IE is
clearly in a much better position than Consequen-
tialism. Consequentialism already treats individuals as
units of equal value but relies on a mere arithmetical
calculus of aggregate happiness, which in the end is
far too simplistic, utterly unsatisfactory and amounts
to little more than a metaphorical device, despite its
crucial importance within the theory. On the contrary,
if required, IE may resort to a highly developed mathe-
matical field (information theory) andtry to adaptto
its own needs a very refined methodology, statistical
means and important theorems, in terms of Sigma
logarithms and balanced statistics. I strongly doubt that
quantities and algorithmic procedures can play more
than a conceptual role in solving moral problems, for
the passage from a quantitative and syntactic context to
a qualitative and semantic one seems to be impossible,
but if a Consequentialist should seriously think other-
wise, it can easily be shown that IE’s approach is
literally orders of magnitude more powerful. That not
even a mathematical theory of information may be
sufficient to introduce a calculating element into our
moral reasoning is not a crucial problem for IE –
which has no where been described as an algorithmic
approach – but may work as areductio ad absurdum
for any naive form of quantitative Consequentialism.
3. the supererogatory problem
There is no limit to how much better a course of
action could be, or to the amount and variety of
good actions that the agent may but does not perform.
As a result, since goodness is a relative concept –
relative to the amount of happiness brought about by
the consequences of an action – Consequentialism may
simply be too demanding, place excessive expectations
on the agent and run into the supererogatory problem,
asking the agent, who wishes to behave morally, to
perform actions that are above and beyond the call
of duty or even of his good will. In IE, this does not
happen because the morality of a process is assessed
on the basis of the state of the infosphere only, i.e.
relationally, not relatively to other processes. So while
Consequentialism is in principle satisfied only by the
best action, in principle IE prizes any single action,
which improves the infosphere according to the laws
specified above, as a morally commendable action,
independently of the alternatives. According to IE,
the state of the world is always morally deprecable
(there is always some entropy), so any process that
improves it is already a good process. This is the
advantage of a minimalist approach, which is more
flexible and capable of appreciating thousands of little
good actions, over a maximalist approach, which is
capable of prizing only the single, best action. In a
society now used to metering cents and seconds of
used-time, the minute attention given to even small
marginal values by the former can be appreciated as
a much more successful alternative.
4. the comparative problem
Consequentialism must accept that, since all actions
are evaluated in terms of their consequences and all
consequences are comparable according to a single
quantitative scale, lives may in turn be judged morally
better or worse merely for contingent reasons: an agent
may simply be born in a context or find herself in
circumstances where her actions can achieve more
good than those of other agents (this is another sense
in which we may speak of moral luck). This is not a
problem faced by IE. Of course, IE shares the very
reasonable point that different agents can implement
the four moral laws more or less successfully and with
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different degrees of efficacy, depending on their exis-
tential conditions. However, unlike Consequentialism,
which endorses a global conception of happiness, IE
assesses the value of a process locally, in relation to
the outcome it can achieve in the specific region of
the environment it affects. This means that IE does
not place different processes in competition with each
other, and so does not have to rank what has been done
by two agents in different situations. This is different
from the problem of assessing what has been done and
what could have been done by the same agent in the
same situation. Circumstances count both for the kind
of processes implementable and for the level of imple-
mentation, but are irrelevant when comparing different
courses of action. Thus, maintaining one’s dignity in a
Nazi prison-camp is simply no better or worse, morally
speaking, than giving a lift to an unknown person
on a rainy day, not just because the two experiences
are worlds apart, but because both agents have done
their best to improve the infosphere, and this is all
that matters in order to consider their actions morally
commendable. If comparable at all, they are so only in
the vague and non-gradable sense in which the good-
ness of a good knife is comparable to the goodness of a
good pencil. Consequentialism is not equally flexible.
Case analysis: Four negative examples
The thesis to be defended now is that not only can
IE dialogue with other macroethics, but it can also
contribute an important new ethical perspective: that a
process or an action may be right or wrong irrespective
of its consequences, motives, universality, or virtuous
nature, but because it affects positively or negatively its
patient and the infosphere, so that, without IE’s contri-
bution, our understanding of moral facts in general, not
just of CE-problems in particular, could not be fully
satisfactory. To support the last remark we shall now
analyse four indicative examples: privacy, vandalism,
biogenetics and death. They are all negative in nature,
but this is just for the sake of simplicity. Let us begin
with the only typical CE-problem I wish to refer to in
this context.
Privacy
It is common to distinguish four kinds privacy:
• a person S’ physical privacy =def. S’ freedom
from sensory interference or intrusion, achieved
thanks to a restriction on others’ ability to have
bodily interactions with S
• S’ mental privacy =def. S’ freedom from psycho-
logical interference or intrusion, achieved thanks
to a restriction on others’ ability to access and
manipulate S’ mind
• S’ decisional privacy =def. S’ freedom from
procedural interference or intrusion, achieved
thanks to the exclusion of others from decisions
(concerning e.g. education, health care, career,
work, marriage, faith) taken by S and S’ group
of intimates
• S’ informational privacy =def. S’ freedom from
epistemic interference or intrusion, achieved
thanks to a restriction on facts about S that are
unknown or unknowable
The last form of privacy is the one that interests
us here. Privacy does not play a significant role in
standard macroethics because it is the property of a
class of objects as patients, not of actions. It becomes a
central issue only within a culture that begins to recog-
nise that entities are clusters of information, and that
privacy is a fundamental concept referring to the integ-
rity and well-being of an information entity. Privacy is
not only an individual’s problem, but may be a group’s
problem, a company’s or corporation’s problem, or a
whole nation’s problem, since all these entities have
their nature fully determined and constituted by the
information they are. How does the problem of privacy
arise then? Within the infosphere, entities form a web
of dependencies and symbiotic relations. The data
output of data collection and analysis processes can
become the input of other information processes (no
hierarchy is implied). Complex relations among data-
producers, data-collectors, data-processors and data-
consumers constitute an ecosystem in which data may
be recycled, collated, matched, restructured and hence
used to make strategic decisions about individuals.
In this scenario, questions of informational privacy
become increasingly urgent the easier it becomes to
collect, assemble, transmit and manipulate huge quan-
tities of data. Note that cases in which privacy and
confidentiality are broken because the information in
question is legally or ethically significant are cases
which society may agree to tolerate: e.g. we may
all agree that in special circumstances bank accounts
may be checked, computer files searched, or tele-
phones bugged. The interesting point, for a theoretical
foundation of information ethics, is not that informa-
tion may have some legal consequences. Typically,
privacy and confidentiality are treated as problems
concerning S’ ownership of some information, the
information being somehow embarrassing, shameful,
ominous, threatening, unpopular or harmful for S’ life
and well-being, yet this is very misleading, for the
nature of the information in question is quite irrelevant.
It is when the information is as innocuous as one may
wish it to be that the question of privacy acquires its
INFORMATION ETHICS: ON THE PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATION OF COMPUTER ETHICS 53
clearest value. The husband, who reads the diary of
his wife without her permission and finds in it only
memories of their love, has still acted wrongly. The
source of the wrongness is not the consequences, nor
any general maxim concerning personal privacy, but a
lack of care and respect for the individual, who is also
her information. Yet this is not the familiar position we
find defended in CE literature. Rather, a person’s claim
to privacy is usually justified on the basis of a logic
of ownership and employment: a person possesses her
own information (her intimately related facts)8 and
has a right to exercise full control over it, e.g., sell
it, disclose it, conceal it, and so forth. There follows
that the moral problem is normally thought to consist
both in the improper acquisition and use of someone
else’s property, and in the instrumental treatment of
a human being, who is reduced to numbers and life-
less collections of information. Sometimes, it is also
argued that privacy has an instrumental value, as a
necessary condition for special kinds of social relation-
ships or behaviours, such as intimacy, trust, friendship,
sexual preferences, religious or political affiliations or
intellectual choices. The suggestion is finally advanced
that a person has a right to both exclusive owner-
ship and unique control/use of her private information
and that she must be treated differently from a mere
packet of information. According to IE, however, this
view is at least partly mistaken and fails to explain the
problem in full. Instead of trying to stop agents treating
human beings as information entities, we should rather
ask them to realise that when they treat personal and
private information they are treating human beings
themselves, and should therefore exercise the same
care and show the same ethical respect they would
exercise and show when dealing with other people,
living bodies or environmental elements. We have
seen that a person, a free and responsible agent, is
after all a packet of information. She is equivalent to
an information microenvironment, a constantly elastic
and permeable entity with centres and peripheries but
with boundaries that are neither sharply drawn nor
rigidly fixed in time. What kind of microinfosphere am
I? Who am I? I am my, not anyone’s, self. I am ‘me’,
but who or what is this constantly evolving object that
constitutes ‘me’, this selfhood of mine? A bundle of
information. Me-hood, as opposed to type-self-hood
and to the subject-oriented I-hood (the Ego), is the
token-person identified as an individual patient from
8 T. Forester and P. Morrison,Computer Ethics, 2nd ed.
Cambridge Mass.: The MIT Press, p. 102, 1994: “Perhaps the
final issue is that concerning information ownership: should
information about me be owned by me? Or should I, as a data-
base operator, own any information that I have paid to have
gathered and stored?”.
within, is an individual self as viewed by the receiver
of the action. We are our information and when an
information entity is a human being at the receiving
end of an action, we can speak of a me-hood. What
kind of moral rights does a me-hood enjoy? Privacy
is certainly one of them, for personal information is a
constitutive part of a me-hood. Accessing information
is not like accessing physical objects. Physical objects
may not be affected by their manipulation, but any
cognitive manipulation of information is also perform-
ative: it modifies the nature of information by automat-
ically cloning it. Intrusion in the me-hood is therefore
equivalent to a process of personal alienation: the piece
of information that was meant to be and remain private
and unique is multiplied and becomes public, it is
transformed into a dead piece of my self that has been
given to the world, acquires an independent status and
is no longer under my control. Privacy is nothing less
than the defence of the personal integrity of a packet
of information, the individual; and the invasion of
an individual’s informational privacy, the unauthor-
ised access, dispersion and misuse of her information
is a trespass into her me-hood and a disruption of
the information environment that it constitutes. The
violation is not a violation of ownership, of personal
rights, of instrumental values or of Consequentialist
rules, but a violation of the nature of information itself,
an offence against the integrity of the me-hood and
the efforts made by the individual to construct it as a
whole, accurate, autonomous entity independent from,
and yet present within, the world. The intrusion is
disruptive not just because it breaks the atmosphere of
the environment, but because any information about
ourselves is an integral part of ourselves, and whoever
has access to it possesses a piece of ourselves, and
thus undermines our uniqueness and our autonomy
from the world. There is information that everyone has
about us, but this is only our public side, the worn side
of our self, and the price we need to pay to society to
be recognised as its members.
Vandalism
IE seems to be able to cast some new light on CE-
problems but – one may object – how successfully
can it treat other types of moral problems? One may
wonder how something which is not a sentient being or
does not even exist may still have a moral standing, no
matter how minimal, and hence impose any significant
claim on the interactive agent so as to influence and
shape his behaviour as a centre of moral respect. The
doubt may seem reasonable, until we realise that it is
in clear contrast with a rather common view of what it
is morally right or wrong, and that this is precisely the
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problem solved by IE, as I shall argue in the analysis
of the present and the following two cases.
Imagine a boy playing in a dumping-ground.
Nobody ever comes to the place. Nobody ever uses
anything in it, nor will anyone ever wish to do so.
There are many old cars, abandoned there. The boy
entertains himself by breaking their windscreens and
lights, skilfully throwing stones at them. He enjoys
himself enormously, yet most of us would be inclined
to suggest that he should entertain himself differently,
that he ought not to play such a destructive game, and
that his behaviour is not just morally neutral, but is
positively deprecable, though perhaps very mildly so
when compared to more serious mischiefs. In fact, we
express our contempt by defining his course of action
as a case of ‘vandalism’, a word loaded with an expli-
citly negative moral judgement. Which macroethics
can help us to understand our sense of dissatisfac-
tion with the boy’s behaviour? Any bio-centric ethics
is irrelevant, and broad environmental issues are out
of question as well, since by definition breaking the
car windscreens does not modify the condition of the
dumping-ground. Consequentialism, in its turn, finds
it difficult to explain why the boy’s behaviour is not
actually commendable, since, after all, it is increasing
the level of happiness in the world. Certainly, the boy
could be asked to employ his time differently, but then
we would be only saying that, much as his vandalism
is morally appreciable, there is something better he
could be doing. We would be running into the super-
erogatory problem without having explained why we
feel that his game is a form of vandalism and hence
blameworthy. The alternative view, that his behaviour
is causing our unhappiness, just begs the question: for
the sake of the argument we must be treated as mere
external observers of his childish game. Deontologism
soon runs out of answers too. Its ends/means maxim
is inapplicable, for the boy is playing alone and no
human interaction is in view. Its imperative to behave
as a universal legislator may be a bit more promising,
but we need to remember that it often generates only
drastic reactions and thus more problems than solu-
tions: the agent can bite the bullet and make a rule
of his misbehaviour. In this case, though, the problem
is even more interesting. For Kant apparently never
thought that people could decide to behave as universal
legislators without taking either the role or the task
seriously, but just for fun, setting up mad rules as
reckless players. Thehomo ludenscan be Kantian
in a very dangerous way, as Stanley Kubrick’sDr.
Strangeloveillustrates. The boy may agree with Kant
and act as a universal legislator, as happens in every
game: he is not the only one allowed to break the cars’
windscreens in the dumping-ground, and anyone else
is welcome to take part in the game. With its stress
on the universal extension of a particular behaviour,
Deontologism may well increase the gravity of the
problem. Just think what would happen if the boy were
the president of a military power playing a war game
in the desert. Virtue Ethics is the only macroethics
that comes close to offering a convincing explanation,
though in the end it too fails. From its perspective,
the boy’s destructive game is morally deprecable not
in itself, but because of the effects it may have on
his character and future disposition. However, in so
arguing Virtuous Ethics is begging the question: it is
because we find it deprecable that we infer that the
boy’s vandalism will lead to negative consequences
for his own development. Nobody grants that breaking
windscreens necessarily leads to a bad character, life
is too short to care and, moreover, a boy who has
never broken a car windscreen might not become
a better person after all, but a repressed maniac,
who knows? Where did David practice before killing
Goliath? Besides, the context is clearly described as
ludic, and one needs to be a real wet blanket to
reproach a boy who is enjoying himself enormously,
and causing no apparent harm, just because there is
a chance that his playful behaviour may perhaps, one
day, slightly contribute to the possible development
of a moral attitude that is not praiseworthy. We come
then to IE, and we know immediately why the boy’s
behaviour is a case of blameworthy vandalism: he is
not respecting the objects for what they are, and his
game is only increasing the level of entropy in the
dumping-ground, pointlessly. It is his lack of care, the
absence of consideration of the objects’ sake, that we
find morally blameable. He ought to stop destroying
bits of the infosphere and show more respect for what
is naturally different from himself and yet similar, as
an information entity, to himself. He ought to employ
his time more ‘constructively’.
Genetic problems
Suppose one day we genetically engineer and clone
non-sentient cows. They are alive but, by definition,
they lack any sort of feelings. They are biological
masses, capable of growth when properly fed, but
their eyes, ears, or any other senses are incapable of
any sensation of pain or pleasure. We no longer kill
them, we simply carve into their living flesh whenever
part of their body is needed. The question here is not
whether it would be moral to create such monsters,
for we may simply assume that they are available, but
rather: what macroethics would be able to explain our
sense of moral repugnance for the way we treat them?
Most people would consider it morally wrong, not
just because of our responsibility as creators, not just
because of the kind of moral persons we would become
INFORMATION ETHICS: ON THE PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATION OF COMPUTER ETHICS 55
if we were to adopt such behaviour, not because of the
negative effects, which are none, and not because of
the Kantian maxims, neither of which would apply,
but because of the bio-object in front of us and its
values. Even if the senseless cow is just a biological
mass, no longer feeling anything, this does not mean
that any of our actions towards it would be morally
neutral. IE could argue, for example, that the cow is
still a body whose integrity and unity demand respect.
Affecting the essence of the body would still be wrong
even if the body was no longer sentient. Indeed, since
the original status of the body was that of a sentient
being, we ought to do our best to reinstate its former
conditions for its own sake and welfare. Let me intro-
duce a second example to illustrate the point further.
There seems to be nothing morally wrong in cloning
one’s lungs, or producing some extra litres of one’s
blood, which would turn out useful in the future,
because when used they will be serving their purpose.
But we find the idea of cloning a whole non-sentient
twin, which we could then keep alive and exploit as a
source of organs, when necessary, morally repugnant,
because to take an arm away from our twin would
mean to affect its integrity adversely and transform it
into something that it was not meant to be, a mutilated
body. We would be showing no care whatsoever, and
our actions would not be implemented for the sake of
the patient.
Death
Standard ethics do not treat death; at most they try
to teach the living how to face it. Non-standard bio-
centric ethics treat only the dying. Only IE has some-
thing to say about the actual dead person and her
moral claims. This last example comes from theIliad.
Achilles has killed Hector. For many days, he has, in
his fury, repeatedly dragged Hector’s body behind his
chariot, round the tomb of his comrade Patroclus. He
has decided to take his full revenge for Patroclus’ death
by not accepting any ransom in exchange for Hector’s
body. Hector will have no burial and must be eaten
by the dogs. Achilles’ misbehaviour seems obvious,
but there is more than one way of explaining why
it is morally blameworthy. Other non-standard ethics
can say nothing relevant and a Deontological approach
is not very useful. Just before dying, Hector asked
Achilles to be kind and to accept his parents’ offers in
return for his body, yet Achilles rejected his prayers
and was ready to face the consequences. He is not
afraid of universalising his behaviour. Although Priam
tries to reason him into returning Hector’s body using
a Deontological argument (“Think of your father, O
Achilles like unto the gods, who is such even as I
am, on the sad threshold of old age. [. . . ]”), Achilles
has been already informed by his mother about the
Gods’ will and is ready to change his course of action
anyway. Actually, he finds Priam’s line of reasoning
rather annoying. The Consequentialist, of course, can
ead us to consider the pain that Achilles’ behaviour
has caused to Priam and Andromache and all the other
Trojans. A supporter of Virtue Ethics can easily argue
that what is morally wrong is Achilles’ attitude, for he
is disrespectful towards the dead, his family, the gods
and the social customs regulating human relations even
during war time. Yet Achilles changes his mind only
because the Gods intervene, and the speech made by
Apollo in the last book of the Iliad, the speech that
convinces the Gods that it is time to force Achilles
to modify his behaviour and return Hector’s body, is
perhaps best read from an IE perspective, a defence of
the view that even a dead body, a mere lifeless object,
can be outraged and deserves to be morally respected:
[51] Achilles has lost all pity! No shame in the man,
shame that does great harm or drives men on to good.
No doubt some mortal has suffered a dearer loss than
this,
a brother born in the same womb, or even a son . . .
he grieves, he weeps, but then his tears are through.
The Fates have given mortals hearts that can endure.
[cf. above here the argument against the simple
fragility of goodness]
But this Achilles – first he slaughters Hector,
he rips away the noble prince’s life
then lashes him to his chariot, drags him round
his beloved comrade’s tomb. But why, I ask you?
What good will it do him? What honor will he gain?
Let that man beware, or great and glorious as he is,
we mighty gods will wheel on him in anger – look,
[65] he outrages the senseless clay in all his fury!”
The Greek word for “outrages” isαεικίξω, which
also means ‘to dishonour’ or ‘to treat in an unseemly
way’. Hector’s body demandsε’ ′λεoν, compassion, but
Achilles has none, for he has lost anyαι’δώς any moral
respect, blinded by his painful passion. Yet the view
from IE requires him to overcome his subjective state,
achieve an impartial perspective and care for the dead
body of his enemy. Achilles must start behaving with
some respect for the body, even if this is now just
κωφὴν γ αι̂αν, senseless clay.
Conclusion
It would be foolish to think that IE can have the only
or even the last word on moral matters. IE does not
provide a library of error-proof solutions to all ultimate
moral problems, but it fulfils an important missing role
within the spectrum of macroethics. There has been
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a fundamental blind spot in our ethical discourse, a
whole ethical perspective missing, which IE and its
applied counterpart, CE, seem to be able to perceive
and take into account. The shift from an anthropo-
centric to a bio-centric perspective, which has so much
enriched our understanding of morality, is followed
by a second shift, from a biocentric to an onto-
centric view. This is what IE and CE can achieve,
thus acquiring a fundamental role in the context of
macroethical theories. The object-oriented ontocentric
perspective is more suitable to an information culture
and society, improves our understanding of moral
facts, can help us to shape our moral questions more
fruitfully, to sharpen our sense of value and to make
the rightness or wrongness of human actions more
intelligible and explicable, and so it may lead us to
look more closely at just what fundamental values our
ethical theories should seek to promote. All we require
from IE is to help us to give an account of what we
already intuit. “Agere sequitur esse”, “action follows
out of being”: the old medieval dictum can now be
given a twist and be adopted as the motto of IE.
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